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Abstract
We run an eye-tracking experiment to investigate whether players change their gaze 
patterns and choices after they experience alternative models of choice in one-shot 
games. In phase 1 and 3, participants play 2 × 2 matrix games with a human coun-
terpart; in phase 2, they apply specific decision rules while playing with a computer 
with known behavior. We classify participants in types based on their gaze patterns 
in phase 1 and explore attentional shifts in phase 3, after players were exposed to the 
alternative decision rules. Results show that less sophisticated players, who focus 
mainly on their own payoffs, change their gaze patterns towards the evaluation of 
others’ incentives in phase 3. This attentional shift predicts an increase in equilib-
rium responses in relevant classes of games. Conversely, cooperative players do 
not change their visual analysis. Our results shed new light on theories of bounded 
rationality and on theories of social preferences.
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1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is a prominent concept in game theory. However, extensive 
empirical evidence has shown systematic departures from standard equilib-
rium predictions in many different games (Camerer 2003). To account for the 
observed deviations, several theories tried to model choices by relaxing some of 
the assumptions of Nash equilibrium. On the one hand, theories such as level-
k (Nagel 1995; Stahl and Wilson 1995; Crawford 2003; Crawford et  al. 2013) 
and Cognitive Hierarchy (CH, Camerer et  al. 2004; Chong et  al. 2016) allowed 
more flexibility in players’ beliefs, describing behavior in terms of hierarchi-
cal levels of strategic sophistication. The levels of strategic thinking are organ-
ized hierarchically starting from players who play randomly (level-0). The next 
level consists of level-1 players, who believe the counterparts to be level-0 and 
best respond to this belief; the following step involves level-2 players, who best 
respond to the belief that the counterparts are level-1 (in level-k theory) or a mix-
ture between level-0 and level-1 (in cognitive hierarchy theory), and so on, mov-
ing up in the hierarchy. On the other hand, theories of social preferences (Rabin 
1993; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000; Andreoni and Miller 
2002; Fisman et al. 2007) relaxed the assumption of self-interest, assuming that 
agents have other-regarding preferences that modulate their utility function and, 
therefore, their choices.
In recent years, behavioral research has sought to describe the process underly-
ing these different models of choice in game play. In particular, empirical works 
involving eye-tracking and mouse-tracking successfully characterized different types 
of players based on their payoff lookup patterns (Costa-Gomes et al. 2001; Hristova 
and Grinberg 2005; Brocas et  al. 2014, 2018; Polonio et  al. 2015; Devetag et  al. 
2016; Polonio and Coricelli 2019). Taken together, results show that sophisticated 
models of choice (level-2 or more) are associated with a specific pattern of infor-
mation acquisition characterized by the exploration and evaluation of both own and 
others’ incentives. However, less sophisticated players (level-1) disregard relevant 
pieces of information that are necessary to evaluate the incentives of the counter-
part and to predict her move (Costa-Gomes et  al. 2001; Polonio et  al. 2015). Yet 
another type of player (cooperative) focuses on intra-cell comparisons between pay-
offs, framing the problem as a pure coordination game and disregarding dominant 
choices of the counterpart: this pattern of visual analysis lead to cooperative choices 
in line with models of social preferences (Devetag et al. 2016).
Although these works successfully describe the processes underlying out-of-equi-
librium choices, they do not fully clarify the nature of the observed heterogeneity in 
gaze patterns. Specifically, we do not know whether level-1 players disregard oth-
ers’ incentives because they do believe that the other players do not have a preferred 
choice, or if players do not realize that they could play a more sophisticated strategy 
(Grosskopf and Nagel 2008; Goodie et al. 2012). At the same time, it is unclear if 
the emergence of strategies based on intra-cell comparisons is driven by the desire 
to maximize social well-being, or if it reflects a misrepresentation of the game struc-
ture and its interactive nature (Devetag and Warglien 2008).
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To address these open questions, we run an eye-tracking experiment in which 
participants initially play different classes of one-shot 2 × 2 matrix games with a 
human counterpart (phase 1). In phase 2, they are asked to apply specific decision 
rules (level-1, level-2, and cooperative) playing the same games with a computer 
algorithm whose strategy is known, and are paid based on the actual compliance 
to the current rule. In phase 3, participants play the same games as in phase 1 with 
another human counterpart. We classify players as level-1, level-2, and cooperative 
types based on their lookup patterns in phase 1, and then explored changes in the 
visual analysis of the game matrix in phase 3, after participants have experienced 
the three models of choice. We are particularly interested in testing if level-1 and 
cooperative players change their type of visual analysis of the game matrix and their 
choices towards the one expected for more sophisticated types (i.e., level-2), after 
being exposed to the level-2 model of choice. We show that level-1 players shift 
their visual analysis towards the one characterizing level-2 players, devoting more 
attention to the counterpart’s incentives. The attentional shift observed in level-1 
players predicts an increase in the proportion of equilibrium responses in games in 
which the opponent has a dominant action. At the same time, cooperative players 
do not change their patterns of information acquisition, suggesting that their behav-
ior is not driven by a misrepresentation of the game structure, but rather by other-
regarding preferences. Taken together, these results offer new insights on theories of 
bounded rationality and social preferences.
2  Methods
2.1  Experimental design
100 students from University of Trento (Italy) participated in this study. At the 
beginning of each experimental phase, we instructed participants about the experi-
mental procedure of the current phase and provided them with examples, control 
questions and training trials.1 If participants failed one of the control questions, the 
instructions were repeated; if they failed the same control question a second time, 
they were dismissed.
In phase 1, each participant plays 48 2 × 2 one-shot matrix games with another 
randomly selected participant of the same pool.2 All participants play in the role of 
row player and have to choose between row I and row II by pressing a button. Each 
game is played only once and no feedback is provided after each game. The order of 
the games is randomized across participants.
In phase 2, participants play with a computer that simulates the behavior of 
three different agents. Participants perform three different tasks that consist in the 
1 We provide the full translation of instructions and control questions in “Instructions and control ques-
tions” in the Electronic Supplementary Material (ESM).
2 To pair each participant with a counterpart, the 48 games consist of 24 pairs of isomorphic games 
where row and column payoffs are identical but switched.
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application of three different decision rules (level-1, level-2 and cooperative): in 
each of the three tasks, participants play the same 48 games of phase 1. All partici-
pants play each of the three tasks in random order. In the level-1 task, participants 
are told that the computer chooses randomly, and they are asked to provide a best 
response to the computer strategy by choosing the row with the highest average pay-
off. In the level-2 task, they are informed that the computer chooses the column with 
the highest average payoff, and they are asked to best respond to this prediction by 
choosing the row that maximizes the player’s outcome within the computer’s pre-
dicted action. In the cooperative task, participants are informed that the computer 
attempts to coordinate with the player to maximize the joint outcome, choosing 
the column containing the cell with the highest average payoff. Given the expected 
action of the computer, participants are asked to coordinate with the computer by 
choosing the row containing the cell that maximizes the joint outcome.
In phase 3, participants play again the same 48 games as in phase 1. They are 
informed that they will play with another participant from a separate experimen-
tal session involving the same games; they also know that their counterpart has not 
taken part in phase 1 and phase 2, and is not aware that the participants in this exper-
iment have undertaken phase 1 and phase 2.3
At the end of the three sessions, players are paid based on their choices in the 
three phases. Specifically, in each of phases 1 and 3, one game is selected randomly 
and the participant’s choice in each game is combined with the counterpart’s choice 
in the same game (1–9 euros in each phase). In phase 2, participants are paid based 
on the rate of compliance to the current decision rule (maximum: 3.36 euros in each 
rule). The sum of the outcomes in the three phases constitutes the participants’ final 
earnings (ranging from 2 to 28.08 euros).
In total, we excluded five participants due to non-compliance to the task 
instructions.4
2.2  Matrix games
We use four classes of 2 × 2 one-shot games (Figure A1, section A.1 of “Additional 
methods and results”, ESM). 16 games are dominance solvable “self” games (DSS), 
in which only the participant (who chooses one of the rows) has a strictly domi-
nant strategy. The other 16 games are dominance solvable “other” games (DSO), in 
which only the counterpart (who chooses one of the columns) has a strictly domi-
nant strategy. DSS and DSO games have a unique Nash equilibrium. DSO games 
differ from DSS games because participants need two steps of iterated elimination 
of dominated strategies to detect the Nash equilibrium. Conversely, in DSS games, 
3 In phase 3, participants are paired with a counterpart who has played the same 48 games in a separate 
experimental session involving a single round of game play, without any preceding task involving deci-
sion rules.
4 Two participants failed for two consecutive times at least one of the control questions of the experi-
ment. Three participants misapplied the level-2 decision rule in the level-2 task (phase 2), exhibiting 
visual analysis and choices that were inconsistent with the decision rule.
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participants need only one step of iterated elimination of dominant strategies over 
their own actions. Games within each of the two classes vary in terms of magnitude 
of payoffs and relations between payoffs, but always maintain the described struc-
ture of dominance between actions.
We also use 16 games with multiple equilibria. Eight of these games are Stag-
Hunt (SH), a coordination game with two equilibria (one of which is Pareto effi-
cient) in which both players can choose between a safe/low return equilibrium and a 
risky/high return one. The other eight games are games of chicken (GOC), an anti-
coordination game with two equilibria in which it is mutually beneficial for players 
to play different strategies.
2.3  Eye movement data analysis
We describe the eye-tracking procedure in detail in section A.1 of “Additional meth-
ods and results” in the ESM.
We characterize lookup patterns by considering transitions, which consist in eye 
movements from one payoff to the next. In particular, we focus on those transitions 
that are important for extracting relevant information about the structure of the game 
(Polonio et  al. 2015; Devetag et  al. 2016). We divide transitions into three major 
types:
1. Own transitions: transitions between the player’s own payoffs.
2. Other’s transitions: transitions between the counterpart’s payoffs.
3. Intra-cell transitions: transitions between the payoffs of the two players, within 
the same cell.
Each type of transition expresses the encoding of specific pieces of information 
within the payoff matrix. We analyze the patterns of analysis by pooling data from 
different types of games, since it has been already shown that patterns of informa-
tion acquisition are stable across classes of games. A high proportion of own tran-
sitions has been shown to predict the implementation of the level-1 (L1) strategy, 
which focuses on the best response to the belief that the counterpart chooses each 
action with equal probability. A high proportion of other’s transitions are associ-
ated with the implementation of the level-2 (L2) model of choice, which requires 
the evaluation of the other’s incentives to predict the counterpart’s move. Intra-cell 
comparisons are used by cooperative players to detect the cell that maximizes the 
joint outcome.
Following Jiang et al. (2016), we classify our participants in types based on the 
comparison between their analysis in phase 1 and the one used to apply the three 
decision rules in phase 2. In particular, for each participant, we take proportions 
of own, other, and intra-cell transitions in phase 1 and we calculate their Euclid-
ean distance from the participant’s proportions of transitions in each of the three 
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tasks of phase 2.5 This gives us individual measures of distance from L1, L2, and 
cooperative visual analyses (L1, L2 and cooperative distances). Participants are then 
assigned to types (L1, L2 or cooperative) based on the lowest between these three 
distances.
Once we have classified participants in types based on gaze data in phase 1, we 
investigate whether their attentional patterns change in phase 3. In particular, we test 
if L1 and cooperative players, in phase 3, switch towards the type of visual analysis 
typical of L2 play. To address this hypothesis, we focus on changes in L2 distance 
from phase 1 to phase 3: the decrease in L2 distance for L1 and cooperative partici-
pants would indicate the increase in the sophistication of their gaze patterns.
3  Results
3.1  Gaze patterns in phase 1 and 3
Results of the classification of participants into L1, L2, and cooperative types based 
on the gaze patterns in phase 1 are reported in Table 1. The average distances in 
phase 1 obviously reflect the classification in types: the L1 group (n = 19) is best 
characterized by the shortest distance to the L1 strategy, the L2 group (n = 35) by the 
shortest distance to the L2 strategy, and the cooperative group (n = 41) by the short-
est distance to the cooperative strategy. Looking at the distances in phase 3, we can 
already observe a notable change in the L1 group, whose L1 and L2 distances are 
now very close to each other. Conversely, L2 and cooperative groups seem to main-
tain similar distances.
We analyze these effects by running a random effects linear regression with errors 
clustered by subject (robust standard errors) using L2 distance as a dependent vari-
able and dummies for group and phase as independent variables (Table 2). Phase 1 
and L2 group serve as a baseline. Results show that L1 players decrease their L2 dis-
tance significantly more than L2 players, while the effect is absent in the cooperative 
Table 1  Average distances from the patterns of visual analysis during the application of decision rules 
in phase 2 (L1 dist., L2 dist., Coop dist.), divided by phase (1 and 3) and groups (level-1, level-2 and 
cooperative)
Groups are defined based on the gaze data in phase 1. Standard deviations in brackets
Group (phase 1) n Phase 1 Phase 3
L1 dist. L2 dist. Coop dist. L1 dist. L2 dist. Coop dist.
Level-1 19 0.14 (0.09) 0.39 (0.12) 0.46 (0.13) 0.27 (0.20) 0.28 (0.18) 0.40 (0.17)
Level-2 35 0.37 (0.08) 0.17 (0.05) 0.31 (0.07) 0.39 (0.10) 0.17 (0.09) 0.31 (0.12)
Cooperative 41 0.45 (0.10) 0.29 (0.08) 0.13 (0.08) 0.42 (0.16) 0.30 (0.12) 0.19 (0.16)
5 In the characterization of gaze patterns in phase 2, we considered only trials in which the current rule 
was correctly applied. In general, participants achieved a very high average accuracy in every task (i.e., 
rule) of phase 2 (level-1: M = 0.98; level-2: M = 0.96; cooperative: M = 0.97).
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group (interaction effects, Table 2: Phase 3 × L1 group, B = − 0.84, p = 0.023; phase 
3 × cooperative group, B = 0.03, p = 0.839). Testing linear combination of coeffi-
cients, we can observe that only the L1 group shows a significant decrease in the 
L2 distance from phase 1 to phase 3 (B = − 0.84, p = 0.016), while there is no effect 
of phase in both L2 (B = − 0.00, p = 0.968) and cooperative (B = 0.03, p = 0.800) 
groups.
To test these effects in more detail, we analyze between-phase changes in the pro-
portion of relevant transitions (Fig. 1).
Specifically, we run three random effects linear regressions with errors clus-
tered by subject (robust standard errors) using as dependent variables the propor-
tions of own, other’s and intra-cell transitions, and dummies for group and phase as 
independent variables (Table A1, section A.2 of “Additional methods and results”, 
ESM). We use phase 1 and L2 group as a baseline. Consistently with the effect of 
switch towards the L2 visual analysis (Table 2), L1 players increase their proportion 
Table 2  Random effects linear regression with errors clustered by subject
Standard errors are robust. L2 distance is the dependent variable and phase, group and their interactions 
are the independent variables. Baseline: L2 group in phase 1
L2 distance B Robust SE Z p 95% CI
Phase 3 (L2 group) − 0.00 0.12 − 0.04 0.968 − 0.23 0.22
L1 group (phase 1) 1.72 0.23 7.51 < 0.001 1.27 2.17
Cooperative group (phase 1) 0.99 0.12 8.02 < 0.001 0.74 1.23
Phase 3 × L1 group − 0.84 0.37 − 2.27 0.023 − 1.56 − 0.11
Phase 3 × cooperative group 0.03 0.16 0.20 0.839 − 0.28 0.34
Intercept − 0.69 0.07 − 10.34 < 0.001 − 0.82 − 0.56
n. obs 190
n. independent obs 95
Fig. 1  Proportion of own, other and intra-cell transitions in phase 1 and phase 3 for the three player types
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of other’s transitions (linear combination of coefficients, B = 1.08, p = 0.004) and 
decrease their proportion of own transitions (B = − 0.77, p = 0.031). These effects 
are stronger in L1 players than in L2 players (interaction effects, other: B = 0.85, 
p = 0.031; own: B = − 0.80, p = 0.033), who in turn do not show any effect of 
phase on transition proportions (linear combination of coefficients, own: B = 0.03, 
p = 0.793; other: B = 0.22, p = 0.076; intra-cell: B = 0.02, p = 0.840). The attentional 
shift of L1 players indicates that the exposure to a more sophisticated rule may 
increase the focus on the evaluation of the other’s incentives to form beliefs about 
the counterpart’s action.
Cooperative players, in phase 3, exhibit a significant increase in own transitions 
(B = 0.32, p = 0.026), but no phase difference in the proportion of other’s transitions 
(B = 0.13, p = 0.237).6 The absence of an effect on other’s transitions in cooperative 
players is important to explain their stability in terms of L2 distance across phases. 
Altogether, our results suggest that cooperative players did not move towards a more 
sophisticated visual analysis (L2) in phase 3.
3.2  Choices in phase 1 and phase 3
In this section, we test whether the switch in visual analysis (i.e., decrease in L2 
distance) from phase 1 to phase 3 in L1 players is directly associated with a change 
in players’ choices. We consider the proportion of equilibrium responses in DSS and 
DSO games and the proportion of risk-dominant equilibrium choices in both SH 
games and GOC. We run regressions with the increase in the proportion of equilib-
rium response (phase 3–phase 1) in each of the four classes of games as dependent 
variables, and the decrease in L2 distance (phase 1–phase 3) as independent variable 
(Table  A2, section A.2 of “Additional methods and results”, ESM). Results show 
that the decrease in L2 distance predicts the increase in the proportion of equilib-
rium responses in DSO games in L1 players (B = 0.61, p < 0.001). This effect leads 
to a modest average increase (16%) in equilibrium responses in DSO games for the 
L1 group (B = 0.64, p = 0.052).7 DSO games are crucial since an equilibrium can be 
found only by predicting the counterpart’s move and best responding to this expecta-
tion. We do not find any other significant effect of phase on the proportion of equi-
librium or risk-dominant choices across groups and classes of games (Table  A3, 
section A.2 of “Additional methods and results”, ESM). In Table 3, we report the 
proportion of equilibrium responses in each class of game in phase 1 and phase 3.
7 Random effects linear regression with errors clustered by subject (robust errors). The proportion of 
equilibrium responses is the dependent variable, dummies for group and phase as independent variables.
6 The modest shifts in gaze patterns observed in cooperative players were not statistically different from 
the ones of L2 players (Table A1 (interaction effects), section A.2 of “Additional methods and results”, 
ESM).
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4  Conclusion
In an eye-tracking experiment, we investigate if unsophisticated types of play-
ers change their patterns of information acquisition and choices after they experi-
ence alternative decision rules. Results show that the visual analysis of level-1 
players shifts towards the one predicted by the level-2 strategy after the exposure 
to alternative decision rules, including level-2 play. This effect is driven by an 
increase in the proportion of other’s payoff transitions, suggesting that the atten-
tional shift is directed towards the evaluation of the incentives of the counterpart 
to form beliefs about her preferred action. These findings indicate that level-1 
players, if exposed to more sophisticated strategies, do realize that they should 
consider more thoughtfully the incentives of the counterpart. Our results are in 
line with the hypothesis that unsophisticated behavior is associated with a non-
exhaustive representation of the game structure (Devetag and Warglien 2008) 
or the action space of the players involved in the interaction (Verbrugge et  al. 
2018). Moreover, the observed attentional shift predicts a selective increase in the 
rate of equilibrium responses in games in which the counterpart has a dominant 
action, suggesting that the other-oriented change in gaze patterns has an impact 
on choices in relevant games. These results are consistent with recent findings 
(Verbrugge et al. 2018) showing that players can increase their level of strategic 
thinking after step-by-step training and instructions about the existence of differ-
ent levels of reasoning in games. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that the average 
shift in choices for L1 players is rather modest, which can be explained in several 
ways. On the one hand, it is possible that the simple exposure to alternative mod-
els of choice, without any information about their efficacy, is not sufficient for a 
robust increase in strategic sophistication. On the other hand, we can hypothesize 
that the increase in the attention towards other’s incentives does not necessar-
ily translate into a comparable increase in strategic thinking. This interpretation 
is in line with recent results (Polonio and Coricelli 2019) showing that level-1 
players choose the level-1 action even if they believe that their counterpart has a 
preferred action.
Moreover, our results show that cooperative players do not change their patterns 
of visual analysis and continue to focus on intra-cell comparisons and play coopera-
tively after exposure to alternative rules. These results suggest that the visual analy-
sis and behavioral strategy of these players are motivated by the desire to achieve 
the social optimum, even if they are aware of the steps of strategic reasoning that are 
necessary for maximizing their personal payoff. This indicates that the behavior of 
cooperative players is driven by other-regarding preferences, as suggested by recent 
studies (Polonio et al. 2015; Devetag et al. 2016), highlighting how theories of social 
preferences can capture behavior of a substantial segment of players in one-shot 
games. Altogether, our results provide novel evidence about the cognitive drivers 
and the stability of attentional patterns and behavioral strategies in games, and shed 
new light on theories of bounded rationality and on theories of social preferences.
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